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ABSTRACT
Since the early 2010s, and especially since the 10 June 2015 resolution of the European Parlia-
ment, there has been a growing interest in monitoring and measuring the rule of law in the Mem-
ber States of the EU. Going beyond the available measurement tools in Europe, such as the EU 
Justice Scoreboard, we discuss the lessons taught by the construction of international indices 
on the rule of law. In addition to the traditional toolbox of a lawyer, we have to turn to other meth-
ods of social sciences and statistics in order to quantify the state of, as well as the changes and 
trends in the rule of law. The methodology regarding this topic has an extensive literature and we 
can enumerate manifold indices measuring the rule of law for example from Europe or from the 
United States (e.g. Freedom House, Bertelsmann Stiftung, World Bank, World Justice Project) 
The present paper is an introduction to the methodology in which we focus on the terminology, 
the collection and aggregation of data, the interpretation of the results and the comparison within 
the countries and over time, by these indices as possible precursors of a future EU scoreboard 
on the rule of law.
 
KEYWORDS:
European Scoreboard of Rule of Law, international indices, Freedom in the World, Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index, Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Justice Project, Rule of Law 
Index, conceptualisation, law & statistics, measuring legal systems, empirical methodology
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András Jakab – Viktor Lőrincz 
 
International Indices as Models for the Rule of Law Scoreboard of the European Union: 
Methodological Issues 
 
 
Introduction: Toward a European Scoreboard of Rule of Law? 
 
 From time to time, in the European public discourse, a need for a mechanism based on 
quantitative data concerning the rule of law in the Member States is addressed. Some proposals 
discuss the use of statistics conceived for another objective, like the EU Justice Scoreboard, where the 
aim is to measure quality, efficiency and independence of justice in the Member States of the EU.1 
Other authors suggest a new scoreboard, on the basis of the existing scoreboards, like the above-
mentioned EU Justice Scoreboard, or the EU Anti-Corruption report, augmented by other sources of 
data.2    
These measurement tools cover only a part of the whole notion of the rule of law. Therefore, 
we turn to other tools: international indices. We do this in order to discuss the methodology of these 
tools as a possible prefiguration for an EU Scoreboard on the Rule of Law. 
We agree with Bárd et al., if the EU wants to establish legal procedure or sanctions based on 
the outcome of the intended scoreboard, this scoreboard cannot be “contracted out” to international 
organisations.3 On the one hand, as we will see, some of the existing international indices are biased 
in favour of a given form of government or market economy. On the other hand, as Versteeg and 
Ginsburg have pointed out,4 there is a high correlation between these indices; therefore, it is 
questionable whether the establishment of a European index based on a brand new methodology is 
necessary or even possible.  
Because of the complex character of these indices, and because of the methodological doubts 
to be described below, an automatized mechanism initiated by the reaching of a given level of 
violations, for example, is less imaginable. A future EU Rule of Law Scoreboard should rather work 
as an aid for decision making.     
 
1. Why Measure Legal Systems?  
 
 In the literature, we find numerous indices on the legal system.5 This fact has several reasons: 
1) One single indicator can sum up easily complicated questions,6 so that the non-professionals and 
the press can also use it.7 We should not underestimate this explanatory character, because it is also a 
                                                          
1 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/justice_scoreboard_2016_en.pdf  see for instance 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/justice-scoreboard-effective-mechanism-enforce-respect-rule-
law and https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/how-monitor-rule-law-democracy-and-
fundamental-rights-eu.pdf 
2 On benchmarking especially: (Bárd et al. 2016, 24–28), the authors also quote the need for annual monitoring 
according to the European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2015 on the situation in Hungary 
(2015/2700(RSP)): (Bárd et al. 2016, 10) 
3 (Bárd et al. 2016, 11) 
4 (Versteeg and Ginsburg 2016) 
5 Observing the increasing number of indices, some authors speak about an ”indicator fatigue” (Hammergren 
2015 esp. p. 311) For advice on terminology and content, we would like to express our gratitude to Mátyás 
Bencze, György Gajduschek, András Jóri, Márton Medgyesi, Ákos Szalai and Balázs Váradi. The general 
methodological summary and the analysis of the rule of law-indices is the work of András Jakab, the Doing 
Business part and the English adaptation was made by Viktor Lőrincz. 
6 (Saisana and Saltelli 2011) 247–268, esp. 248.  
7 This is also dangerous, because the measured value also can impact reality, for example, measuring high level 
of corruption can boost the acceptability of corruption and by doing so, it can also increase real corruption. See 
(Ginsburg 2011) 270: ”Perceptions can produce their own reality”, 279: „a bad image can become a self-
fulfilling prophecy”. 
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tool of democratic accountability. 2) Indices are also often considered as external measures in debates 
about legal interpretation (evaluating reforms or the performance of the government), they can also set 
goals and directions of policies.8 Because of this, international organisations and NGOs also use 
indices in order to foster and propagate best practices by comparing points of different countries. 
Exemplary countries usually score at the top of the scale set up by these organisations.9 A side-effect 
of this approach is the case when for example a government changes policy only to change the score 
on a scale, without treating the real problem.10 3) Finally, economists need quantitative data in order 
to test political-economical correlation (for example between the rule of law and economic 
performance).11 
 The problem is that we want to measure a directly unobservable phenomenon (rule of law for 
example).12 Fortunately, statistics has several methods to handle this, and in the next chapters, we will 
present this approach for lawyers, without entering into the mathematical details. We focus on the 
measurement of the rule of law, but the fundamental methodological problems are similar in the case 
of other legal systems too.13  
 Measuring and quantification is not part of the traditional toolbox of a lawyer,14 and the 
attitude of lawyers toward statistical methods is also ambiguous. Sometimes, they underestimate the 
indices because of the extent of simplification (or even discredit them, based on some unlikely 
outcomes), but they also admire the unintelligible mathematical models. In the present paper, we 
would like to find the golden mean between these two extreme approaches, by using the indices as 
important tools and as additional information for the better understanding of the overall view, treating 
them with precaution and critics.  
 A remark on terminology: we mean by Indicator a single number or feature and by index, 
composite indicators.15 
 
2. Methodological steps  
 
 In this chapter, we present the methodological questions based on the legal literature and on 
the OECD Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators (2008).16 The main rule is that the design 
of the index must be transparent, and the methodological choices must be grounded, otherwise the 
indices can serve pre-established policies.17  
 First, we have to note that some steps of the index-building need thorough knowledge in legal 
doctrine (e.g. conceptualization), and other steps need an expertise in statistics (e.g. handling and 
aggregating data). As there are a few experts who excel at both fields, index-building is usually team-
work, based on the co-operation of legal experts and statisticians, even if they sometimes speak 
completely different languages.  
 
                                                          
8 (Botero, Nelson, and Pratt 2011),esp. 153, 159-160. 
9 About this problem in the practice, and concerning the question of legitimacy, see (Davis, Kingsbury, and 
Merry 2012, 71–104)71–104; (Bogdandy and Goldmann 2008, 241–98)241--298; (Krever 2013, 131–50)131–
150; (Rosga and Satterthwaie 2009, 253–315) 253–315. 
10 (Botero, Nelson, and Pratt 2011, 159)159. In general see: (Saltelli 2006, 65–77)65--77.  
11 Desrosières grouped the states in five clusters according to their methods of using indicators. In this system 
socialist planned economy, the mercantilism of Colbert and the France of Charles de Gaulle are in the same, 
engineer-state group. (Desrosières 2015) 329–353, 335–337.  
12 (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011a, 220). 220: “inherently unobservable nature” 
13 E.g. (Blank 2004) siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/Benchmarking.pdf. 
14 Indices can be useful in the field of comparative law too, see (Michaels 2009, 765–96)765--796. But lawyers 
are usually cautious toward this approach. Other legal academics, linked to an underscoring system, used to 
emphasise the methodological shortcomings of the indices, like (Fauvarque-Cosson and Kerhuel 2009, 811–
30)811–830.  
15 About the etymology and use of the word “indicator” see (Porter 2015,) 34--55. For a definition extended on 
composite values see: (Merry, Davis, and Kingsbury 2015)1--24, 4. 
16 (European Commission, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and SourceOECD 
(Online service) 2008) 20-21; www.oecd.org/std/42495745.pdf.  
17 (European Commission, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and SourceOECD 
(Online service) 2008)13-14.  
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2.1. Conceptualisation 
 
 Before starting the construction of the index, we should clarify what we want to measure. 
Babbie, quoting Kaplan, classifies measurable things into three categories: 1) direct observables like 
mark on a questionnaire, 2) indirect observables bringing minutes of corporate board meetings as one 
of the examples, 3) and constructs, like the IQ, prejudice or government.18 Lawyers are chiefly 
familiar with the latter field. A main part of a lawyer’s work is the terminological analysis. If we want 
to measure rule of law for example, we have to define it. The main control of these definitions is the 
professional public. If the majority of this public (constitutional lawyers for instance) finds the 
definition acceptable, the definition seems to be appropriate.19 We can, of course encounter numerous 
terminological debates,20 for example, the concept of rule of law is not devoid of this (and because of 
the debates on values, we cannot expect a full consensus on this matter),21 we can use a mainstream 
term but with caution. Some indices also diverge concerning the definition used, we will discuss this 
problem later. Legal indices usually measure the de facto characteristics of a system, so a “nice” law 
but with a corrupt, oppressive or ineffective implementation will underscore on these scales.22 
 
2.2. Choosing data 
 
 If we have already determined the thing to be measured, we have to find data for the 
measurement. We cannot measure the quality of a given legal system directly. Therefore, we use 
proxies (approximate data): the opinion of experts or that of the public (soft data) or approximate 
facts (hard data, i.e. the number of registered crime, the budget of the courts, frequency of the 
modification of law, frequency of condemnation of a State by an international court of human 
rights).23  
 The main concern about expert opinions is the choice of experts and the subjectivity of the 
opinion. This is an especially sensitive problem in politically polarised countries.24 As a (partial) 
remedy we can recommend a transparent selection method, which is also well-balanced (in a country 
with inter-ethnic tensions for instance, the proportion of the experts should reflect the overall ethnic 
distribution), or using as many experts as possible (by random sampling or with the participation of 
every available expert).25 A further problem is that in case of general questions (characteristic for 
legal indices), it is not easy to find an expert who is up-to-date in every field (for example, the 
criminal procedure, which is an important constituent of the rule of law, is less known for 
constitutional lawyers).26 In several countries, the participation implies risk for the expert too (if for 
example she or he criticise the current regime), even if anonymity is granted, obtaining (unbiased) 
                                                          
18 (Babbie 2013, 168–69); (Kaplan 1964) 54–56. 
19 (Saisana and Saltelli 2011) 249. 
20 On this phenomenon in general (lack of consensus and problems of definition in the case of composite 
indicators) see for example (Cherchye et al. 2007) 749–779. 
21 (Botero, Nelson, and Pratt 2011) 166 quoting (Saisana and Saltelli 2011) 248: “composite indicators are 
value laden constructs”. On the necessary political content of indices, see also (Urueña 2015) 543–584. 
22 As a deterrent, we can mention the Global Right to Information Rating (www.rti-rating.org), in which two 
NGO’s analysed the state of Right to Information, but with rather surprising results: Moldova outscored the 
United Kingdom, and Russia performed better than the United States. Despite any disclaimer (like the 
implementation might differ from the written rule), it’s an excellent example, how unelaborated goal-setting and 
conceptualisation can make indices completely useless. On the questions of conceptualisation, see also 
(Rottenburg 2015) 1--33, 11--18. 
23 (Parsons 2011) 170--185, 175-176. Proxies are used by the Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment Index 
(SERF) too, among other things, Right to Health Indicator is measured by the so-called age sixty-five survival 
rate, and the Right to Housing Indicator is measured by the access to clean water and sanitation. (Fukuda-Parr, 
Lawson-Remer, and Randolph 2015)59--77. 
24 (United Nations et al. 2011)1, see www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/un_rule_of_law_indicators.pdf. 
In politically polarised countries, the results of the polls may vary: a popular government can increase trust in 
independent institutions (like the courts), and vice versa.  
25(Gajduschek 2014), 110. 
26 On this problem, see The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators (note 25.) 24. 
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reports will be more complicated.27 But obvious advantage of the expert opinion is that wide opinion 
polls are expensive, and hard data are not always available from every single country.   
 Using polls and surveys in the general population, we can also take into consideration the 
situation of vulnerable groups. The situation of these groups is less represented in expert opinions and 
in hard data. Survey data can also enlighten the differences between hard data and reality.28 
Unfortunately, opinion surveys are expensive and the questions are limited (as the general population 
cannot answer very specific questions). Sampling and measurement in no-go zones and among 
vulnerable groups is also complicated. Public opinion is also very changable especially if it is 
influenced by the news.29 Another critic is the limited possibility of cross-country comparison, 
because of the divergent historical mentalities.30 
 Although the use of hard data is objective, the scope of measurement is very limited. A great 
part of our questions cannot be measured even by using proxy hard data (it is also possible, that 
something is measurable by hard data, but there is no data from a given country). We also have to be 
careful with available data: 1) sometimes they are corrupted by the authorities (e.g. police sometimes 
discourage the victims of small crimes where the success of investigation is unlikely, in order to 
ameliorate statistics). 2) Sometimes, the measured value only has an impact on the question in 
extreme cases (e.g. budget of courts on rule of law). 3) And sometimes, it is not obvious at all, 
whether a boost of an objective value has a positive or negative effect on the phenomenon (high 
efficacy of the public prosecutor can signal authoritarian judiciary tradition, and a low one can be a 
signal of an incompetent prosecutor) (4) And finally the partial character of the data (i.e. objective 
data are only available on certain special questions, not on the whole) can lead to arbitrary selection.  
 Some indices combine the different sources, making the results more robust (see for example 
the WJP-Index below), and the data sources are also cross-checked (the method is called 
triangulation). 
 
2.3. Statistical treatment and aggregation of data31 
 
 We know different types of data: 1 or 0 (yes or no), points on a given scale32 (for instance, the 
experts of the Freedom House evaluate the questions on a scale ranging from 1 to 7), percentages (e.g. 
trust in institutions in the Eurobarometer), etc. In order to put all the data in one final index, we have 
to normalise (homogenise) them.33 
 For cross-country comparison, we have to adjust the data according to the size of the given 
country.34 
 There are several statistical methods to handle missing data. We can, for instance, simply 
delete the whole row of data (i.e. if an expert answers 24 of 25 questions only, we can delete all his or 
her answers, or we can only leave out the unanswered question. The problem is that 1) the missing 
data are usually non-random (e.g. some experts are afraid of answering several questions), in this 
case, simply disregarding the missing answer can bias the result; 2) deleting data can also decrease the 
reliability of the result (that is increasing standard error).35 Therefore, if the quantity of missing data is 
                                                          
27 The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators (note 25) 28. 
28 (Parsons 2011)177. 
29 (Parsons 2011)178. 
30 (Parsons 2011) 179. 
31 With this chapter, we don’t want to teach lawyers how to build indices using complicated statistical methods 
but rather deter them from doing so. High quality work can only be done by qualified statisticians (sociologists 
or economists). Inadequate methodologies and poor indices can affect the reputation of the interdisciplinary 
field too.  
32 Setting levels of measurement is in itself problematic: do we use nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio measure? 
See (Babbie 2013, 180–84) 155--158. 
33 E.g.: transforming a 0-1 scale into 0-100 means that 1 will be 100, a 0-4 scale into 0-100 means that the value 
of 1 will be 25, 2 is equal to 50, 3 is 75 and 4 is 100. Another possible method is the standardisation, i.e. the 
rescaling of variables in order to obtain a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. 
34 (Saisana and Saltelli 2011)251. 
35 (Saisana and Saltelli 2011) 252. 
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more than 5%, we use imputation.36 If, for example, an expert answered only 24 of the 25 questions, 
we can deduce her or his 25th, imputed answer from the other questions given by the expert in 
question. Or we can use the mean of the answers of the other experts, eventually belonging to the 
same cluster (based on the similar answers). We can use another, more complicated statistical 
methods too, every method has different advantage and inconvenience, but we can reduce the bias of 
the outcomes based on these methods. 
 We have to examine separately the non-arbitrary selection of the indicators, on which the 
indices are based.37 Indices based on many but bad indicators are called “indicator rich but 
information poor”.38 We can test this issue by using multivariate analysis. We examine the relation 
between the indicators, and the impact of them on the final outcome. We always have to test the 
influence of the individual variables on the final results (i.e. examine robustness).39  
 We also have to treat outliers, i.e. observations distant from other observations. In many 
cases, these are results of a measurement error. Here too, we can use several statistical methods to 
handle this problem: we can simply delete the values, use imputation techniques, or introduce natural 
logarithm, for example, to increase goodness of fit. Of course, there are some real outliers too. We 
have to take them into consideration in the model.  
Weighting is an important question too. We can sum up the data with the same weight, but 
some characteristics are more important than others (for instance, concerning rule of law, it is more 
important that the police cannot shoot innocent civilians arbitrarily than is the duration of a 
procedure),40 On the other hand, it is not easy to find an objective method for weighting (because of 
the lack of knowledge, and therefore, because of the lack of experts’ consensus).41 Testing indices 
without weight, using multivariate analysis, we can only change them by adding or deleting 
indicators. In the case of weighted indicators, we can change the weight too, without deleting the 
indicator. The underlying method of weighting must be clear and explicit too.42 In several cases, 
weighting can be implicit too: if for instance, we build in strongly correlated indicators into the index, 
it means also the weighting of the given question. 
Instead of weighting, but in order to lower the impact of extreme values on the final index 
(considering the example above: in order to avoid the overscoring legal systems where the police can 
kill innocent people, but where other institutions are working well), we can use a geometric mean 
instead of an arithmetic mean. This permits a better comparability, i.e. the state with the arbitrary 
police but with a good performance on other scales will not perform better than a similar (slightly 
underperforming) state without such an extreme value.43 Instead of using means, we can also use 
factor analysis, but the description of this method is beyond the framework of the present study.44 
 We can also build sub-indices from indicators. This is useful because 1) it can diminish 
misunderstandings and biases, occurring in the case of using isolated indicators, 2) and we can 
measure the complex and multi-faceted characteristic of the institutional functions.45 We can build 
dimensions from sub-indices. These are on a higher level of abstraction than the indicators, but on a 
                                                          
36 see(Little and Rubin 2002) on  filling in for missing values. 
37 On this topic, see in detail e.g. about the democracy-indices (Müller and Pickel 2007)511--539. 
38 (European Commission, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and SourceOECD 
(Online service) 2008)25.  
39 The multivariate analysis, mentioned earlier shows the inner correlation structure of the indicators. Analysing 
robustness on the contrary shows the impact of the indicators and methodological choices (normalisation, 
weighting) on the index.  
40 As an example of a weighted index of the rule of law see for example (Tai 2007)1--19. 
41 (Saisana and Saltelli 2011) 254. wrote on the subjective character of weighting. Also sceptical toward 
weighting:  (United Nations et al. 2011) 5. On the methods of weighting, see (European Commission, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and SourceOECD (Online service) 2008)31–33. 
and (Sharpe and Andrews 2012)An example of an index without weights is the Islamic Constitutions Index 
(Ahmed and Gouda 2015) 1–74. 
42 (Saisana and Saltelli 2011)255. 
43 (Saisana and Saltelli 2011) 256. Instead of taking the sum of the values and dividing it by the number of 
numbers (arithmetic average), we take the nth root of the product of n numbers (geometric average). 
44 See in details (Rosenthal and Voeten 2007)711–728. 
45 (United Nations et al. 2011).) 3. 
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lower level compared to the final index: for example, in the case of Rule of Law, the working of the 
justice, or that of the police. We also can statistically test the relation between the dimensions, also in 
order to measure the impacts on the final index. Here we can use factor analysis as well or principal 
component analysis or Cronbach's alpha test.46 Thereafter we can correct the list of indicators, or the 
weights and the classifications into sub-indices (so that they measure similar but not identical things, 
with an existent but not full correlation). While building up the final index, we have to allow for the 
possibility of decomposition too, so that we can deduce from it the basic data and indicators.47 
 
2.4. Presenting, interpreting and comparing results 
 
 The results are better represented in charts, but textual information is also needed for their 
interpretation. We have to keep in mind that the numbers in themselves can only represent 
correlation.48 In order to establish a causal relation on the basis of this, the content needs to be 
considered further.  
 Visualisation of the results with graphs, for example, can be spectacular, too. These can 
influence (or manipulate) interpretation and understanding, too.49 The results of an analysis extended 
on multiple countries can be represented on a map, or the countries can be classified into clusters.  
If there are other indices on the same question, we should compare them with our own index, 
and we should explain the differences (low correlation), too. A very good summary of the different 
traditions of validation in comparative research on measuring democracy is given by Seawright and 
Collier. The presentation of the four great directions distinguished by the authors (i.e. levels of 
measurement, structural equation modelling with latent variables, pragmatic approach and case based 
approach) exceed the framework of this study.50    
 
3. International Indices on rule of Law Compared to the EU Justice Scoreboard   
 
 Here, we present four internationally recognized indices on legal systems compared to the EU 
Justice Scoreboard. These are the indices of the Freedom House (“Freedom in the World”, FIW), the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung (“Bertelsmann Transformation Index”, BTI), the World Bank (“Worldwide 
Governance Indicators”, WGI),and  the World Justice Project („Rule of Law Index”, WJP RLI).51 In 
order to give a clear-cut picture, we represent the similarities and differences in a chart.52 In the four 
indices, we also present the measurement of the Rule of Law, in order to point out the differences of 
conceptualization.   
                                                          
46 See (European Commission, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and SourceOECD 
(Online service) 2008) 25--27, 63--82. 
47 (European Commission, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and SourceOECD 
(Online service) 2008)16. 
48 A well-known example ad absurdum on the difference between strong correlation and causality: according to 
the superstition, the presence of storks can boost fertility. This belief seems to be confirmed by the data: 
childbirth is correlated with the number of storks in a given region. In fact, in urbanised regions, the hunting-
ground of storks are very limited. Parallel to this, in urban, industrialised regions, the birth rate used to be lower 
than in rural regions. So there is no causality between the number of storks and number of new-born babies. 
(Babbie 2013, 94, 442–49)483-484.  
49 See further for example: (Telea 2015); (Ballstaedt 2012). 
50 (Seawright and Collier 2014 especially Table I. on page 113.) 
51 For the former tree, a good overview is given by (Thiery, Shering, and Muno 2009). About Freedom House 
recently: (Bradley 2015) 27–74; on the Rule of Law Index: (Urueña 2015) 75--102; and (Restrepo Amariles 
2014)193--234. For a methodological and comparative analysis of the WGI, see: (Gisselquist 2015) 23—54. 
52 The chart is based on the following literature: for the first three indices: (Skaaning 2010) 449–460; (Nardulli, 
Peyton, and Bajjalieh 2013)139--192; (Thiery, Shering, and Muno 2009); (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
2011); and the websites of the indices. For WJP RLI: Developing Indicators to Measure the Rule of Law: A 
Global Approach. A Report for the World Justice Project, 2008 Vera Institute of Justice; (Botero and Ponce 
2011) On the EU Justice Scoreboard, see: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/scoreboard/index_en.htm  
  
 
 FIW BTI WGI WJP RLI EU Justice Scoreboard 
Goals (Measured 
values?)53 
Global comparative 
evaluation of 
political rights and 
civil liberties  
Evaluates and measures the steps of 
developing and transition countries 
(Entwicklungs- und 
Transformationsländer) toward 
democracy and market economy 
Aggregate and individual 
governance indicators 
 
Measurement of the de facto 
rule of law, (based on the 
people’s experience, not on 
the legal rules)  
Measuring quality, efficiency and 
independence of justice in the 
Member States of the EU 
How long and 
how frequently? 
Yearly since 1972 
195 countries today 
(+15 disputed or 
special territories). 
Since 2006 two-yearly (a pilot study 
in 2003) today  129 developing and 
transition countries (i.e., every non-
member countries of the OECD in 
1989, provided that the population is 
over 2 millions) 
Since 1996, yearly since 2002 on 
215 economies at the present time.  
Yearly since 2011 (in 
2012/13, a unified biannual 
report), in 102 countries  
Yearly since 2013 in all the 
Member States of the EU)  
Conceptualisation Political rights:  
(1) Electoral process 
(2) political pluralism 
and participation,  
(3) Functioning of 
Government. 
 
Civil Liberties:  
(1) Freedom of 
Expression and 
Belief 
(2) Associational and 
Organizational Rights 
(3) Rule of law [in 
common sense with 
somehow arbitrary 
elements],  
(4) Personal 
Autonomy and 
Individual Rights  
 
There are four 
questions on rule of 
law: 
The final index (Status Index) is 
composed of  a democracy and 
market economy part 
 
The Democracy Index is based on 
an explicit and philosophically 
elaborate democracy-concept: 
(1) Stateness  
(2) Political participation 
(3) Rule of law  
(4) Stability of democratic 
institutions  
(5) Political and Social Integration 
 
 
The four constituents of Rule of 
Law are partially overlapping, 
according to the traditional legal 
doctrine :  
(1) Separation of powers,  
(2) Independent judiciary  
(3) Prosecution of office abuse,  
(4) Civil rights 
for six dimensions of governance:  
(1) Voice and Accountability 
(2) Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence  
(3) Government Effectiveness  
(4) Regulatory Quality  
(5) Rule of law  
(6) Control of Corruption 
 
“Rule of law captures perceptions 
of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and 
violence.”54  
 
Conceptualisation is problematic,55 
rather formal than substantial 
criteria. 
  
Measuring rule of law on the basis 
Based mainly on UN-
documents, the definition of 
the rule of law is a system 
relying on the following four 
principles:  
“(1) The government and its 
officials and agents as well 
as individuals and private 
entities are accountable 
under the law. 
(2) The laws are clear, 
publicized, stable, and just; 
are applied evenly; and 
protect fundamental rights, 
including the security of 
persons and property and 
certain core human rights. 
(3) The process by which the 
laws are enacted, 
administered, and enforced is 
accessible, fair, and efficient. 
(4) Justice is delivered 
timely by competent, ethical, 
and independent 
I. Efficiency of justice systems 
1.Length of proceedings 
2.Clearance rate  
3.Pending cases 
4.Efficiency in specific areas  
II. Quality of justice systems 
1.Accessibility 
2.Resources 
3.Assessment tools 
4.Quality standards 
III. Independence  
1.Perceived judicial independence 
2.Structural independence 
3. Work of the judicial networks 
on judicial independence 44 
                                                          
53 According to (Thiery, Shering, and Muno 2009) 154. the correlation between FIW and BTI is very high (0,938), but the WGI correlates with the FIW and BTI only by 
0,664 and 0,663 respectively this might signal that the WGI is measuring something else than the another two.  
54 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/rl.pdf  
55 Especially critically (Ginsburg 2011) 271. 
 (1) Is there an 
independent 
judiciary?  
(2) Does the rule of 
law prevail in civil 
and criminal matters? 
Are police under 
direct civilian 
control?  
(3) Is there protection 
from political terror, 
unjustified 
imprisonment, exile, 
or torture, whether by 
groups that support or 
oppose the system? Is 
there freedom from 
war and 
insurgencies?  
(4) Do laws, policies, 
and practices 
guarantee equal 
treatment of various 
segments of the 
population? 
of 23 sources (including the partial 
indices – and not the main indices - 
of BTI, FIW, WJP.) using 86 data 
units (44 of them are 
representative, 42 are not” 
Representative indicators are 
indicators that cover a set of 
countries in which the distribution 
of governance is likely to be 
similar to that in the world as a 
whole.[…] In contrast non-
representative indicators cover 
either specific regions (for example 
the BEEPS survey of transition 
economies or the LatinoBarometer 
survey of Latin American 
countries), or particular income 
levels (for example the World 
Bank CPIA ratings that cover only 
developing countries).”56 
representatives and neutrals 
who are of sufficient 
number, have adequate 
resources, and reflect the 
makeup of the communities 
they serve.”57 
 
According to the principles 
above, they measure 9 
factors and 47 sub-factors: 
(1) Constraints on 
Government Powers 
(2) Absence of Corruption 
(3) Open Government  
(4) Fundamental Rights 
(5) Order and Security 
(6) Regulatory Enforcement 
(7) Civil Justice 
(8) Criminal Justice 
(9) Informal Justice 
(i.e. traditional, tribal, and 
religious courts)58 
Selecting data Expert’s opinions 
evaluating with 
points ranging from 1 
to 7, a general 
codebook with the 
definition of the 
grades only, not that 
of the individual 
questions. 
 
The list of experts is 
Mainly based on expert’s opinion, 
with a standardised codebook. 
Points ranging from 1 to 10 (with 
separate instructions for every single 
question). Not only numbers but a 
descriptive text (two reports on a 
country: a foreign and a domestic 
report, the latter commenting the 
former too); the list of experts is 
public, but intransparent 
 
Based on several hundreds of 
indicators from 32 different 
sources. 
So-called General Population 
Polls: 1000 respondents from 
the three largest cities of the 
country, selected by 
probability sampling. 
+ Qualified Respondents’ 
Questionnaires: 25 legal 
professionals/country in 
average (the scores from the 
two types of Questionnaire – 
when available – were 
 
Most of the data is acquired from 
the Council of Europe 
Commission for the Evaluation of 
the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), 
other sources are contact persons 
on national justice systems ( 2 ), 
the European Network of 
Councils for the Judiciary 
(ENCJ), the Network of the 
Presidents of the Supreme Judicial 
                                                          
56 (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011, 243) 
57 http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law  
58 They also collect data on the 9th factor (Informal Justice) but they do not take into consideration in the aggregate index and in the ranking. These systems are especially 
complicated, and it is not too easy to measure comparably the efficiency and fairness in these cases. Therefore, the aggregate index is made up of 8 factors and 44 sub-factors 
“only”. 
  
not public, the 
selection is not 
transparent. 
 
Measuring 27 
questions  in 8 groups 
hard data too (on inflation and 
education). 
 
17 criteria with 49 questions. 
weighted 50%-50%) 
 
Selecting experts: two 
methods: 
(1) random sampling from a 
list of experts like law 
professors, attorneys, NGO 
professionals etc.  
(2) WJP network of 
practitioners and academics 
 
 
Courts of the EU, Association of 
the Councils of State and Supreme 
Administrative Jurisdictions of the 
EU (ACA), the European 
Competition Network, the 
Council of Bars and Law 
Societies of Europe (CCBE), the 
Communications Committee, the 
European Observatory on 
infringements of intellectual 
property rights, the Consumer 
Protection Cooperation Network, 
Eurostat, the European Judicial 
Training Network (EJTN), the 
World Bank and the World 
Economic Forum.  
Methods of 
aggregation 
arithmetic mean arithmetic mean Aggregation in three steps: 
(1) Each question of the original 
source is assigned to one of the six 
indicators 
(2) Questions of the original 
sources are rescaled between 0 and 
1, 1 meaning the best outcome 
(3) Constructing a weighted 
average using an Unobserved 
Components Model 
 
Aggregation in five steps 
(1) Translating the 
questionnaire into numbers  
(2) Raw country scores 
aggregated from the 
individuals (experts or 
general public) 
(3) Normalising the raw 
data. 
(4) Aggregating normalized 
data into factors and sub-
factors using simple average  
(5) Final ranking of the 
countries.  
No final overall composite index, 
part-indices and indicators only  
Degree of 
transparency 
Low but progressing 
(not every data are 
available on the 
website, the sub-
indices of the rule of 
law are also 
inaccessible) 
High (all data used is available on 
the website, with the related part of 
the country-report). 
Very elaborate calculations, but 
inherits the intransparency of the 
sources.  
high High: relatively simple indices 
Strength (1) Data available 
since 1972  
(2) Well-known 
trademark 
(1) Transparency 
(2) The controlling function of the 
second report   
(3) Better conceptualisation 
compared to the FIW  
(4) As a last step an expert 
(1) Elaborate mathematical model  
(2) Robust (the change of a single 
indicator do not impact deeply the 
whole). 
Also focusing on the 
perception of rule of law in 
vulnerable groups (like the 
low-income groups) 
  
The choosing of experts is 
Mainly basic, easily quantifiable 
data 
 committee corrects the data 
regionally and globally for the better 
international comparison 
transparent 
Shortcomings and 
critics 
(1) Geometric mean 
would be better here 
than arithmetic mean 
(2) lack of 
transparency (coding 
below the sub-
categories remains 
not transparent),  
(3) the differences 
between the grades of 
the 1-7 are unclear  
(4) lack of 
consistency in time: 
changing questions 
(5) the borders 
between the 
dimensions are 
unclear 
(6) Selection of 
experts is not 
transparent 
(1) Geometric mean would be better 
here than arithmetic mean 
(2) Not transparent selection criteria 
of the experts.  
(3) The Status Index implies that the 
political and economic development 
are strongly correlated, which is not 
necessarily true (see China). 
(1) Inheriting the shortcomings of 
the original sources  
(2) Market-economy –oriented, 
because of the numerous market-
indicators.  
(3) Difficult comparison in time 
and between countries as the 
sources are constantly changing.  
(4) Weak conceptualisation;  
(5) No text, only numbers. 
(1) No text, numbers only 
(except one paragraph 
interpreting the results in the 
last version)  
(2) The Constraints on 
Government Powers sub-
index is centred on 
presidential systems. 
No final aggregate index, 
changing methodology, from our 
point of view, the main goal of the 
indices is to measure quality, 
efficiency and independence of 
justice in the Member States of 
the EU, and not the rule of law in 
general. 
General 
evaluation of the 
index 
Old methodology and 
lack of transparency. 
Developed methodology, 
transparent and global index with a 
part focusing on the rule of law 
The method minimalizes the 
subjective elements (except for the 
choosing of indicators) the main 
focus is not the rule of law 
Very elaborate methodology, 
focusing on the aspects of 
the rule of law 
The EU Justice Scoreboard is 
different to the other indices 
enlisted here, as it is closer to 
classical judiciary statistics. 
  MPIL Research Paper Series No. 2017-21 11 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In the former chapters, we presented the difficulties of the construction of indices measuring 
the rule of law. First of all, these indices are used by academics, even if the unanticipated shifts in 
these indices are covered by the press.59 Some of the numerical data is also taken into consideration 
by investors. The proposals described above in the Introduction go beyond this: they want to link a 
sanction or a procedure to a given level of measurement. Sanctions based on numbers are of course 
not new in constitutional or European law. Consider, for example, the budgetary constraints (i.e.: 
deficit brakes, debt brakes and expenditure brakes) in several Constitutions,60 or the Maastricht 
criteria and the regulation of the budgetary balance on the EU-level.61 For the first sight, they may 
serve as a model for the procedure and sanction based on the rule of law indices. Budgetary rules and 
fiscal policy are perceived by the market, therefore clear and simple signals are needed. The 
transgression of the determined numbers should activate almost automatically a procedure reaching a 
sanction at the end. Meanwhile, as Adamski pointed out, despite the seemingly clean-cut rules, the 
authorities are not always consequent.62  
In our case, we should first determine the methodology and the EU authorities responsible for 
the construction of the index. The indices presented above are constructed mostly independently from 
the European Union, this means independence to some extent, but if we would like to link some 
sanctions to these indices, we cannot outsource them. On the other hand, the construction of such 
indices can take years. As we have seen above, there is a constant adjustment of the methodology 
during the years. A new index should be tested during numerous periods in order to obtain a credible 
tool. A further question is the discretional power of the authority supervising the compliance of the 
states. In the case of budgetary question, the competence of an already existing body is questionable.63 
Even if the transgression of the given limit is clear, the necessary measures are complicated.64  It is 
doubly so in the case of the rule of law: while in the case of excess deficit, a given body can simply 
examine whether the budget of next year projects better figures, underperformance in the field of rule 
of law can have numerous origins. And in the budget, you can regroup or diminish some sums, but in 
the case of the rule of law, the different factors are not substitutable.   
                                                          
59  
60 see for example (Jakab 2016, 21–27) 
61 (Adamski 2013) 
62 (Adamski 2013, 52–63) 
63 On the level of the State, we can for example question the competence of an ordinary Constitutional Court 
(Jakab 2016, 25–26)  
64 In the case of budgetary imbalance, painful structural reforms are also needed (Adamski 2013, 56) 
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